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International Payments and Five 
Foundations of Wire-Transfer Law 
RAJ BHAJA• 
Funds-transfer law - or wire-transfer law, as it is more commonly called - is 
new in the United States, and non-existent in many jurisdictions. During the 
early 1990s American states enacted Article 4A of the Uniform Commercial 
Code (UCC). It is the principal law in the United States governing wire 
transfers.1 In 1992 the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
* Associate Professor of Law, School of Law, College of William and Mary, 
Williamsburg, Virginia. 
This article is adapted from the author's chapter in Bruce]. Summers (ed), The 
Payment System: Design, Managemen~ and Supervision (1994), with the kind 
permission of Mr Summers. The author wishes to thank Professor John Head 
(University of Kansas School of Law), Mr Andrew Hook (International Monetary 
Fund) and Mr Setsuya Sato (The World Bank) for their many helpful comments and 
suggestions on earlier versions of this article. 
Article 4A does not govern paper-based methods of payments like negotiable 
instruments or letters of credit (though, of course, payment orders associated with 
an electronic funds transfer may be issued in writing). The version of Art 4A cited 
here is the 1989 Official Text with Comments approved by the American Law 
Institute and National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL). States have been quick to incorporate Art. 4A into their Uniform 
Commercial Codes, with over forty states enacting the statute in less than three 
years. Information on state enactment is provided by NCCUSL. As discussed below, 
Regulation}, which governs Fedwire, essentially incorporates this version of Art 4A 
by reference, with some modifications and additions. Regulation] is codified at 12 
CFR, part 210 subpart B. Similarly, the New York Clearing House has selected New 
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(UNCITRAL) published a Model Law on International Credit Transfers (Model 
Law). It is the main international legal agreement on wire transfers? What 
animating principles underlie Article 4A and the Model Law? What lessons can 
countries seeking to draft their own wire-transfer law take from Article 4A and 
the Model Law? 
This article addresses these questions. It examines the legal foundations of 
large-value credit transfer systems and the importance of certainty, efficiency 
and fairness in wire-transfer law. A case study is presented to highlight key 
terminology and concepts. Thereafter, five particularly noteworthy legal rules 
are discussed in the context of the case study: 
(i) a rule defining the scope of the law; 
(ii) a rule establishing when the rights and obligations of parties to a 
wire transfer are triggered; 
(iii) a receiver finality rule; 
(iv) a rule assigning liability for interloper fraud; and 
(v) a money-back guarantee rule, coupled with provisions on discharge. 
Finally, strategic concerns affecting the drafting of a wire-transfer law are 
identified. Overall, this article is addressed to the lawyer or policy-maker 
seeking to identify and understand the key features of wire-transfer law, 
perhaps with a view to drafting such a law for his or her own jurisdiction. 
In the first section the relationship between the legal framework for a large-
value credit transfer system and the development of an ideal system is 
discussed. The second section briefly surveys the five foundations of a legal 
framework for large-value credit transfer systems. The third section introduces 
a case study of a wire transfer and employs essential legal terminology. In the 
fourth section the five foundations of a legal regime governing wire-transfer 
law are discussed in detail using the essential legal terminology. The fifth 
section considers general principles of drafting a wire-transfer law in the 
(Cont.) 
York's version of Art 4A as the law applicable to CHIPS. In addition, relevant 
additional provisions are set forth in Federal Reserve Bank operating circulars and 
the CHIPS rules. For a discussion of Regulation J and Operating Circular No 8, and 
of the CHIPS rules, see Ernest T. Patrikis, Thomas C. Baxter, Jr. and Raj Bhala, Wire 
Transfers (1993), part Ill. 
2 Like Art. 4A, the Model Law governs electronic transfers and not paper-based 
methods of payment like negotiable instruments or letters of credit. Hereinafter, 
references are to sections in Art. 4A and certain analogous articles in the Model Law. 
The Model Law is found at UN GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No 17, at Annex 1, p. 48, UN 
Doc. A/47/17 (1992). For a discussion of the Model Law, see Patrikis, Baxter and 
Bhala, op cit note 1, parts III and V. 
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special context of developing and transition economies; the countries of the 
former Soviet Union and Baltic region are considered as examples. Finally, 
concluding observations are set forth in the sixth section. 
The Importance of the Governing Legal Regime 
Why Care About Wire-Transfer Law? 
Why care about wire-transfer law? After all, wire transfers are not the only 
cros~-border payments mechanism. For instance, transactors could make 
international payments by means of a draft, note or bill of exchange. However, 
it is not an overstatement to say that wire transfers are the most significant 
cross-border payments mechanism. First, because they are used to settle 
financial market transactions - foreign exchange trade, derivatives transac-
tions, etc - they are the backbone of international financial markets. Secondly, 
because of the huge amount of funds transferred by wire, they demand special 
attention. 
The first reason can be put in more conceptual terms. A necessary (but not 
sufficient) condition for a thorough discussion of wire transfers is a treatment 
of the governing legal regime, such as Article 4A or the Model Law. Whether a 
wire transfer is a popular means of payment from the view of individual 
financial market participants, and whether it is conducted in a safe and sound 
manner from the view of bank regulators, are issues that necessarily involve 
the law. Wire-transfer law should serve the interests of the institutions that look 
to large-value credit transfer systems to settle their payment obligations and in 
particular should facilitate growth in domestic and international transactions. 
Ill-conceived wire-transfer rules, or a legal void, can retard the growth and 
development of large-value credit transfer systems. In turn, the underlying 
financial market transactions which generate many payments obligations may 
be hampered. 
With respect to the second reason, large-value credit transfers are of 
enormous importance. Over 80 per cent of the dollars transferred in the 
United States are sent over large-dollar electronic funds-transfer networks. 
Every day in the United States roughly 2 trillion US dollars are transferred by 
means of Fedwire and the Clearing House Interbank Payments System 
(CHIPS). Thus, every few days the equivalent of the entire US gross national 
product is transferred by Fedwire and CHIPS. Every two to four days the total 
gross national product of the Group of Ten (G-10) countries is transferred 
electronically through the appropriate wire-transfer system. Depending on 
the structure of the laws governing wire transfers, potential users and 
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providers of wire-transfer services may find these services either more or less 
attractive. 
Certainty, Efficiency and Fairness 
With so much money transferred by wire each day, and with the average value 
of each transfer so high, the potential for large losses is great. Thus, institutions 
sending and receiving such payments require a clear, comprehensible and 
sensible legal regime to answer two basic questions: first, how should a wire 
transfer normally work; and secondly, what happens if a mishap occurs? There 
is a third public policy issue of particular concern to central bankers, namely 
systemic risk - how can this risk be minimised and contained? 
One way to approach these issues is to consider the theoretical under-
pinnings of an ideal international payments system. Arguably, the system must 
have three salient features: it must be certain (ie reliable), efficient (ie high 
speed, low cost and high security), and fair (ie equitable in its apportionment 
of liability). 3 In other words, large amounts of funds must be transmitted at low 
cost and with high security, and the rights and obligations of parties to the wire 
transfer must be allocated in a fair manner. Accordingly, a legal framework for 
a wire-transfer system is essential to ensuring that all three features are present 
in the system. 
First, burdensome or unclear legal rules raise the costs of a wire transfer, 
thereby reducing efficiency. In turn, the system becomes less attractive to 
potential providers of system services, users of those services, or both. For 
example, suppose a mutual fund instructs its bank to make a US$5 million 
payment to a stockbroker in order to buy shares for the fund. The payment is 
made through the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) but, 
before the payment transaction is complete, BCCI fails. Does the mutual fund, 
the stockbroker, the creditors of BCCI, or some other party bear the US$5 
million loss? If the legal framework fails to provide an unequivocal answer, 
then uncertainty is generated. In reaction to uncertainty, system providers and 
users must take precautions - that is, insure against risks; hence the cost of 
providing and using the system will inevitably increase. 
Secondly, the lack of rules on authenticity and security reduces reliability. 
Consequently, the system creates uncertainties and risk for both its providers 
and users. For example, suppose a US bank that receives a US$500,000 
3 See generally Raj Bhala, 'Paying for the Deal: An Analysis of Wire Transfer Law and 
International Fi~~ncial Market Interest Groups' (1994) 42 Kansas Law Review, 
p. 667; and Patrikis, Baxter and Bhala, op cit note 1, pp. 23-25. 
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payment instruction from one of its customers discovers - after the payment is 
made to an offshore bank - that the instruction is unauthorised. What are the 
rights and obligations of the US bank, its customer and the offshore bank? If 
the legal framework does not provide a clear answer, then the system will be 
viewed as unreliable by prospective users and providers of system services. 
Thirdly, an over-allocation of duties to system providers or to system users 
can be unfair. In addition, it may lead to a non-level playing field. For example, 
where liabilities are skewed toward non-bank users of a large-value credit 
transfer system, banks may enjoy a monopoly position. When potential users 
or providers perceive a system to be unfair, they simply will not use or 
provide, respectively, system services. 
An Overview of the Five Legal Foundations 
Thus, there is an integral link between the legal foundations of a wire-transfer 
system and the extent to which that system is an ideal one, particularly for 
financial market participants transferring vast sums to one another. How do 
Article 4A and the Model Law make this link? The essence of Article 4A and the 
Model Law can be grasped by understanding five legal rules. These rules -
what I call the five legal foundations of wire-transfer law - are designed to 
make the wire-transfer systems to which the rules apply more efficient, reliable 
and safe.4 
4 
The five foundations are: 
(i) a scope rule to differentiate the parties and payment instructions that 
are included in the law from those that are not included; 
(ii) a trigger event to indicate the moment when the rights and 
obligations of a party to a wire transfer are manifest; 
(iii) a receiver finality rule to establish when credit to an account is 
irrevocable; 
(iv) a money-back guarantee to cover situations where a wire transfer is 
To be sure, these are not the only rules in the US or international wire-transfer laws, 
and reasonable people may contend that there are other equally or even more 
essential statutory provisions. The economic and policy justifications for the five 
legal foundations are beyond the scope of this article. For theoretical discussions of 
wire-transfer law, see Bhala, op cit note 3; and Bhala, 'The Inverted Pyramid of Wire 
Transfer Law' (1993) 82 Kentucky Law journal, p. 347, reprinted in Joseph]. Norton 
eta/ (eds), Cross-Border Electronic Banking (1995). See also Fairfax Leary, Jr. and 
Patricia B. Fry, 'A "Systems Approach" to Payment Modes: Moving Toward a New 
Payments Code' (1984) 16 Uniform Commercial Code Law journal, p. 283. 
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not completed, coupled with a discharge rule for cases where the 
transfer is completed; and 
(v) an antifraud rule to allocate liability for fraudulent payments 
instructions. 
To appreciate these foundations, it is first necessary to master the 
terminology of wire-transfer law and to use applicable terms in the context 
of a typical wire transfer.5 Accordingly, the five critical elements in American 
and international wire-transfer law are set forth in the appropriate legal 
terminology and context. 
A Case Study 
The following discussion of the five foundations is aided by reference to a case 
study of a wire transfer. Consider the following hypothetical transaction:6 
5 
6 
(i) The Merrill Lynch Dragon Fund is an American mutual fund 
dedicated to investing in Far East equities. The Dragon Fund buys 
stock on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange worth US$100,000 
through a Singapore-based brokerage firm named Vickers Ballas 
Securities. Vickers Ballas arranges for the delivery of the stock to the 
custodial account of the Dragon Fund, and the Dragon Fund seeks 
to pay Vickers Ballas for the stock by means of a wire transfer. 
(ii) The Dragon Fund and Vickers Ballas maintain bank accounts at 
different commercial banks. The Dragon Fund has its account at the 
Chase Manhattan Bank, while Vickers Ballas uses the Development 
Bank of Singapore (DBS). 
The terms 'funds transfers' and 'credit transfers' are used interchangeably, as are the 
terms 'funds-transfer systems' and 'large-value credit transfer systems'. 'Wire 
transfer' is a common term, though one not used in Art. 4A or the Model Law. A 
definition of 'funds transfers' is found in UCC Art. 4A s. 104(a), and a 'funds-transfer 
system' is defined in Art. 4A s. 10S(a)(S). 'Credit transfer' is defined in Art 2(a) of the 
Model Law, and 'credit' or 'funds-transfer system' is not defined. 
A payments obligation to be discharged by a wire transfer can arise from virtually 
any sort of und~rlying contractual relationship between the buyer-payer and 
se1ler-p~ye~. While the underlying contractual obligation in this hypothetical 
tr~nsactlon mvolves goods, in reality, financial transactions generate the bulk of 
wue transfers. Most large-value funds-transfer activity is associated with securities 
and foreign exchange trading. See Bhala, 'The Inverted Pyramid of Wire Transfer 
Law', op cit note 4; and Bank for International Settlements, Payment Systems in 
Eleven Developed Countries (3rd ed, 1989), p. 215. 
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(iii) The Dragon Fund instructs Chase Manhattan to pay US$100,000 to 
Vickers Ballas? The instruction contains the name and account 
number of Vickers Ballas, and the name and identifying number of 
Vickers Ballas' bank. 
(iv) Chase Manhattan complies with the instruction of its customer by 
further instructing a second bank, Barclays Bank, to pay US$100,000 
to Vickers Ballas. (It is assumed that Chase Manhattan and DBS do 
not maintain accounts with one another, hence the wire transfer 
must be routed through correspondent accounts at Barclays Bank.) 
The second payment instruction again contains the relevant 
information about Vickers Ballas and the DBS. 
(v) Barclays Bank also complies with the instruction it receives. It 
further instructs DBS to pay US$100,000 to Vickers Ballas. 
(vi) DBS complies with the third instruction and pays Vickers Ballas. 
This hypothetical transaction is represented in Figure 1. The chronological 
steps in the transaction are indicated by numbers in parentheses. The terms of 
Article 4A and the Model Law are used, highlighted and explained in detail 
below. 
Each party, and the actions it undertakes, has a specific legal label in Article 
4A and the Model Law. Applying the correct labels is the first step in identifying 
the five legal foundations of wire-transfer law. Each payment instruction is a 
'payment order if it meets the requirements of the definition of that term 
(given in the following section). This term is critical in defining the scope of 
the law. 
The Dragon Fund is the 'originator of the wire transfer - that is, 'the sender 
of the first payment order in a funds transfer'.8 The bank at which the Dragon 
Fund maintains an account and to which the first payment order is addressed -
Chase Manhattan Bank - is the 'originator's bank'.9 Vickers Ballas is the 
'beneficiary' of the originator's payment order.10 Also, it is the beneficiary of 
each payment order issued in the wire-transfer chain that implements the 
originator's order - ie the payment orders issued by the originator's bank and 
7 
8 
9 
Quite possibly, this payment will be made against delivery of the shares - ie the 
Dragon Fund will not authorise a wire transfer unless and until it receives 
confirmation that the stock is being or has been transferred to its custodial account 
UCC Art 4A s. 104(c). See also Model Law, Art 2(c) (defining 'originator'). 
UCC Art 4A s. 104(d). There is no requirement in this definition, or elsewhere in Art 
4A, that the originator have a pre-existing account relationship with the originator's 
bank. There is no definition of 'originator's bank' in the Model Law. 
10 UCC Art. 4A s. 103(a)(2). See also Model Law, Art. 2(d) (defining 'beneficiary'). 
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Figure 1 Hypothetical example of a wire transfer 
(6) Payment order issued by the (10) Payment order issued by the 
originator's bank intermediary bank 
(7) Payment order received by the (11) Payment order received by the 
intermediary bank. beneficiary's bank. 
(8) Payment order accepted by the (12) Payment order accepted by the 
intermediary bank. beneficiary's bank 
(9) Settlement between the originator's (13) Settlement between the intermediary 
bank and the intermediary bank. bank and the beneficiary's bank. 
I I 
' Chase Manhattan Bank. Barclays Bank. DBS. 
The originator's bank 
with respect to the 
originator's payment 
order and a sender 
with respect to its own 
order issued to the 
intermediary bank. 
The intermediary bank. 
A receiving bank with 
respect to the 
originator's bank's 
payment order and a 
sender with respect to 
its own order issued 
The beneficiary's 
bank. A receiving 
bank with respect 
·~ 
to the beneficiary's 
bank. 
(2) Payment order issued by the originator to the 
originator's bank. 
to the payment order 
issued by the 
intermediary bank 
(3) Payment order received by the originator's bank. 
( 4) Payment order accepted by the originator's 
bank. 
(14) Payment 
Credit to the 
beneficiary's 
account. 
(5) The originator pays the originator's bank for 
the payment order. 
' 
Merrill Lynch Dragon (1) Underlying contract Vickers Ballas 
Fund. Originator. ._ calling for the beneficiary ~ Securities. 
Also a sender. to deliver stock to the Beneficiary. 
originator in constderauon 
of $100,000.00. 
Adjunct to (12): Obligation of the 
originator to pay $100,000 to the 
beneficiary is discharged when the 
beneficiary's bank accepts the 
payment order. 
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the second bank. The 'beneficiary' is simply 'the person to be paid by the 
beneficiary's bank.'11 
The bank at which Vickers Ballas maintains its account and to which funds 
are credited- DBS- is the 'beneficiary's bank'.12 This term is reserved for 'the 
bank identified in a payment order in which an account of the beneficiary is to 
be credited pursuant to the order or which otherwise is to make payment to 
the beneficiary if the order does not provide for payment to an account' .13 The 
second bank, Barclays Bank, is the 'intermediary bank', in that it is 'a receiving 
bank other than the originator's bank or the beneficiary's bank'.14 
The terms 'sender and 'receiving bank' are generic: a sender is 'the person 
giving the instruction to the receiving bank' and the receiving bank is 'the bank 
to which the sender's instruction is addressed'.15 The Dragon Fund (the 
originator), Chase Manhattan Bank (the originator's bank), and Barclays Bank 
(the intermediary bank) are all senders. The originator's bank, intermediary 
bank, and beneficiary's bank (Vickers Ballas' bank) are receiving banks. 
The 'funds (or wire) transfer' is the entire 'series of transactions, beginning 
with the originator's payment order, made for the purpose of making payment 
to the beneficiary of the order'.16 It includes the payment orders issued by the 
originator's bank and the intermediary bank, because these are 'intended to 
carry out the originator's payment order'P The wire transfer 'is completed by 
acceptance by the beneficiary's bank of a payment order for the benefit of the 
beneficiary of the originator's payment order'.18 
The sale of stock by Vickers Ballas to the Dragon Fund is the underlying 
contract between the beneficiary and originator of the wire transfer. Under the 
terms of the contract, the originator has a US$1 00,000 payment obligation, and 
the originator begins the wire transfer for the purpose of discharging this 
obligation. 19 
The concept of discharge is tricky in two senses. First, its legal importance is 
not always clearly understood. The crucial point is that until the wire transfer is 
completed, which occurs when the beneficiary's bank accepts a payment 
11 UCC Art 4A s. 103(a)(3). See also Model Law, Art. 2(d) (defining 'beneficiary'). 
12 UCC Art 4A s. 103(a)(3). Here, too, there is no requirement for a pre-existing 
account relationship. There is no definition of a 'beneficiary's bank' in the Model 
Law. 
13 UCC Art 4A s. 103(a)(3). 
14 UCC Art 4A s. 104(b). See also Model Law, Art. 2(g) (defining 'intermediary bank'). 
15 UCC Art. 4A s. 103(a)(4)-(5). See also Model Law, Art 2(t) (defming 'receiving 
bank'). 
16 UCC Art 4A s. 104(a). See also Model Law, Art. 2(a) (defining 'credit transfer'). 
17 UCC Art 4A s. 104(a). 
18 Ibid. See also Model Law, Art. 19(1). 
19 UCC Art 4A s. 406(b). See also Model Law, Art. 19 footnote. 
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order for the beneficiary, the originator is legally liable on this obligation - it is 
not discharged.Z0 The originator's obligation to pay the beneficiary based on 
the contract for stock is not discharged until the beneficiary's bank accepts a 
payment order for the benefit of the beneficiary. Thereafter, the originator 
cannot be sued by the beneficiary for breach of contract on the grounds of 
non-payment. 
Secondly, seemingly synonymous uses of the terms 'payment obligation' (or 
'payment'), 'settlement obligation' (or 'settlement') and 'discharge' sometimes 
generate confusion. In the wire-transfer context, the underlying payment obli-
gation refers to the obligation of the originator to pay the beneficiary. This 
obligation arises from the underlying contractual obligation between those 
two parties. When the obligation is satisfied, it is said to be legally discharged. 
Each sender whose payment order is accepted by a receiving bank has a 
payment obligation to that bank, namely to pay for the accepted order. The 
terms 'settlement' and 'settlement obligation' refer to an interbank payment 
obligation that arises from the acceptance of a payment order; that is, they 
refer to the payment obligation as between a sending and receiving bank. 
However, these interpretations are based more on customary and trade usage 
than on specific sections of Article 4A or the Model Law.21 
Each receiving bank has a decision to make when it receives a payment 
order: should it accept or reject the order? The receiving bank is not obliged 
to accept an order.Z2 A receiving bank may reject an order because the 
sender does not have sufficient funds in its account to pay for the order, or a 
receiving bank may reject a payment instruction because it states conditions 
with which the bank is unwilling or unable to comply. A receiving bank other 
than the beneficiary's bank (ie the originator's bank and intermediary bank) 
accepts a payment order by executing the order.23 'Execution' of a payment 
20 UCC Art. 4A s. 104(a), Art. 4A s. 406(a)-(b). See also Model Law, Art. 19 footnote. 21 Patrikis, Baxter and Bhala, op cit note 1, pp. 72-73. For an argument that trade 
usages should be recognised as a means of self-regulation in international financial 
markets, see Raj Bhala, 'Self-Regulation in Global Electronic Markets Through 
Reinvigorated Trade Usages' (1995) 31 Idaho Law Review p .863. 22 UCC Art. 4A s. 209 and official comment 3. See also UN Model Law, Arts. 7(2), 8(2), 9, 
10(1). The receiving bank is free to enter into an account agreement with its sender-
customer specifying that the bank will accept all payment orders issued by that cus-
tomer. In this instance, the bank cannot reject the order. In addition, a receiving 
bank is unable to reject a payment order transmitted through Fedwire. This is 
because one of the ways in which a receiving bank accepts a payment order is by 
obtaining payment from its sender. UCC Art. 4A s. 209(b)(2), Model Law Art. 6(b). 
~ith a .wire transfer through Fedwire, the payment order and payme'nt (ie the 
mstructton and value) move simultaneously from sender to receiving bank. Patrikis, 
Baxter and Bhala, op cit note 1, p. 174. 23 UCC Art. 4A s. 209(a). A broader definition is set forth in Art. 7(2) of the Model Law. 
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order means that the bank 'issues a payment order intended to carry out the 
payment order received by the bank'.24 Thus, the originator's bank accepts 
the payment order of the originator by issuing an order that conforms with 
the instructions set forth in the order of the originator. Similarly, the 
intermediary bank accepts the payment order of the originator's bank by 
issuing a conforming order designed to implement the originator's bank's 
order. 
A beneficiary's bank, however, does not accept a payment order by 
execution.25 Rather, the beneficiary's bank, if it accepts the order, is required to 
pay the beneficiary the amount of the order.26 Typically, it does so by crediting 
the account of the beneficiary maintained at the beneficiary's bank. 
A receiving bank's decision to accept or reject a payment order is partly a 
credit judgment: if the order is accepted, then the sender must pay for the 
order (eg the originator must pay US$100,000 to the originator's bank if the 
bank accepts the originator's order, the originator's bank must pay US$100,000 
to the intermediary bank if the intermediary bank accepts the originator's 
bank's order, and so forth). 27 The credit issue arises where a sender does not 
currently have funds in its account with the receiving bank sufficient to pay for 
the payment order. The receiving bank may, at its discretion, grant the sender 
an overdraft, but any receiving bank, including a central bank, may charge 
interest to the sender for the amount and duration of the overdraft.28 
24 UCC Art. 4A s. 301(a). See also UN Model Law, Art. 2(1). 
25 UCC Art. 4A s. 301(a). The Model Law does not clarify this point. 
26 UCC Art. 4A s. 404(a). While this duty is plainly sensible, the liability for failing to 
perform it is unique in the statute. Failure to pay the beneficiary the amount of an 
accepted order is the only instance where the statute expressly provides for 
consequential damages, though the bank has a defence that it had a 'reasonable 
doubt' as to the entitlement of the beneficiary to payment. With respect to other 
duties imposed on receiving banks, liability for consequential damages is precluded 
unless such banks expressly agree to assume this liability in writing with their sender-
customers. See UCC Art. 4A s. 305. The liability rules of Art. 4A are not treated in this 
article. However, they are relevant not only for those involved in the development of 
wire-transfer law in other countries but also for those giving or seeking practical legal 
advice. See Note, 'Cancellation of Wire Transfers Under Article 4A of the Uniform 
Commercial Code: Delbrueck & Co. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. Revisited' 
(1992) 70 Texas Law Review, p. 739; Ernest T. Patrikis, Thomas C. Baxter, Jr. and Raj 
Bhala, 'Article 4A: The New Law of Funds Transfers and the Role of Counsel' (1991) 
23 UCC L] 219; and Thomas C. Baxter, Jr. and Raj Bhala, 'Proper and Improper 
Execution of Payment Orders' (1990) 45 Business Lawyer, p. 1447. 
27 UCC Art. 4A s. 402(b)-(c). See also Model Law, Art. 5(6). 
28 With respect to a Federal Reserve Bank, see, for example, 'Modification of the 
Payments System Risk Reduction Program; Daylight Overdraft Pricing', 57 Fed. Reg. 
47084 (14 October 1992) and 'Modification of the Payments System Risk Reduction 
Program; Measurement of Daylight Overdrafts', 57 Fed. Reg. 47093 (14 October 
1992). 
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If the bank entitled to payment is a receiving bank other than the 
beneficiary's bank (ie the originator's bank or an intermediary bank), then 
the obligation to pay arises upon acceptance but does not mature until the 
execution date; that is, payment is not due until the day on which it is proper 
for the receiving bank to execute the order.29 Generally, the execution date is 
the day the order is received.30 This is referred to as 'same-day execution', 
which means that the receiving bank executes the order on the day it is 
received from the sender. On or before that day, the sender must pay for the 
order.31 Payment by a sender to a receiving bank for a payment order issued 
by the former and accepted by the latter may be made by a number of means. 
These include receipt of final settlement on the books of a central bank or 
through a funds-transfer system (which may involve bilateral or multilateral 
netting), a credit to an account of the receiving bank with the sender, or a debit 
to an account of the sender with the receiving bank.32 
If the bank entitled to payment is the beneficiary's bank, then again the 
obligation to pay arises upon acceptance by that bank.33 Here, however, the 
sender (in the hypothetical transaction, the intermediary bank) need not pay 
the beneficiary's bank until the payment date; that is, the date on which the 
amount of the payment order accepted by the beneficiary's bank is payable to 
the beneficiary.34 Typically, this is the date of receipt.35 The beneficiary's bank 
can pay the beneficiary by crediting its account. 36 The beneficiary is paid as a 
matter of law when it 'is notified of the right to withdraw the credit' or funds 
'are otherwise made available to the beneficiary', or the bank 'lawfully applies 
the credit to a debt of the beneficiary•.37 
29 UCC Art. 4A s. 301(b). Receiving banks are free to establish cut-off times for the 
receipt of payment orders. See UCC Art. 4A s. 106 and Model Law, Art 2(k). Note 
that the Model Law defines 'execution period' in lieu of the concepts of 'execution 
date' and 'payment date'. 
30 Ibid. See Model Law, Art. 11(1). 
31 In the hypothetical transaction, assume that the originator issues its payment order 
o~ ~ay 1 and the originator's bank receives it on that day. Assuming that the 
ongmator does not specifically instruct the originator's bank to execute on a future 
day, the bank will execute it on day 1. The execution is, therefore, on the same day 
as the day of receipt (day 1), and payment from the originator to the originator's 
bank is due on or before that day. 
32 UCC Art 4A s. 403(a). See also Model Law, Art. 6(b). 33 See UCC Art. 4A s. 404 and Model Law, Art. 10(1). However, as discussed below, the 
Model Law leaves the details of the relationship between a beneficiary's bank and a 
beneficiary to local law. 
34 UCC Art. 4A s. 401. 
35 Ibid. 
36 UCC Art 4A s. 40S(a). 
37 Ibid. 
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The above discussion has not expressly highlighted the role of a central 
bank in a wire transfer. The conventional but incomplete view is that a cen-
tral bank acts as an intermediary bank. To be sure, a central bank often is an 
intermediary between two receiving banks. However, it can play any role in a 
wire transfer: originator, originator's bank, intermediary bank, beneficiary's 
bank, or beneficiary. Thus, the critical point is that a central bank can be a 
sender or receiving bank at any point in a wire-transfer chain. The role of a 
central bank in a wire transfer makes little legal difference unless the 
applicable wire-transfer law is modified by the regulations of the central 
bank.38 However, there is an important practical difference. A central bank 
cannot go bankrupt, thus there is no credit risk associated with sending a 
payment order to, or receiving a payment order from, a central bank. If a wire 
transfer is not completed, then the reason for the non-completion will lie 
with a party other than the central bank. 
Discussion of the Five Legal Foundations 
Scope Rule 
What is the scope of application of the law? How does a party seeking to send 
funds electronically know whether the transmission is a wire transfer 
governed by applicable wire-transfer law? Who is included and who is 
excluded? Appropriate answers to these questions foster certainty and 
efficiency, in part by reducing the likelihood of litigation about the coverage 
of the law and thereby reducing potential legal costs. 
These questions are answered in Article 4A and the Model Law by referring 
to the definition of 'payment order'. If an instruction is not a 'payment order; 
then Article 4A is not applicable. Under Article 4A, the term 'payment order' 
means: 
... an instruction of a sender to a receiving bank, transmitted orally, electronically, 
or in writing, to pay, or to cause another bank to pay, a ftxed or determinable 
amount of money to a beneficiary, if: 
(i) the instruction does not state a condition to payment to the beneficiary 
other than time of payment, 
38 An example of such rules would be Regulation] of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System. As indicated below, however, Regulation] elects Art 4A as 
the governing law and the deviations from the statute are, on balance, minimal. 
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(ii) the receiving bank is to be reimbursed by debiting an account of, or 
otherwise receiving payment from, the sender, and 
(iii) the instruction is transmitted by the sender directly to the receiving bank or 
to an agent, funds-transfer system, or communication system for transmittal 
to the receiving bank.39 (Emphasis added.) 
A similar definition is provided in the Model Law.40 
There are five salient features of the definition of 'payment order'. First, the 
instruction must be issued to a 'bank'. While any person can be a 'sender', only 
a 'bank' can be a 'receiving bank'.41 A 'bank' is 'a person engaged in the 
business of banking and includes a savings bank, savings and loan association, 
credit union, and trust company'.42 This definition is flexible, applying to a 
variety of financial institutions that offer account services - regular commercial 
banks and certain other types of financial institutions that take deposits and 
make loans. Thus, the scope of application is potentially wide. 
Secondly, the amount of the instruction must be 'fixed or determinable'. In 
most cases the application of this requirement is straightforward. In the 
hypothetical transaction, the US$100,000 amount is 'fixed'. 
Thirdly, the definition of 'payment order' requires that the instruction 
contain no condition other than time of payment.43 If the Dragon Fund's 
instruction to Chase Manhattan said 'pay US$100,000 on day 5 if you receive 
delivery of documents relating to the stock purchased', then the requirement 
would not be satisfied. Only the statement regarding day 5 is permissible; the 
statement regarding presentation of documents to the bank is a condition 
other than time of payment. If both statements are included in the instruction, 
then it is not a 'payment order' and Article 4A is inapplicable. Under the Model 
Law, a receiving bank can accept a conditional payment order, strip off the 
condition, and then execute the unconditional payment order.44 
The fourth requirement concerns payment for the payment instruction. A 
receiving bank that receives a payment instruction from its sender must be 
39 UCC Art. 4A s. 103(a)(1). 
40 See Model Law, Art. 2(b). 
41 4A UCC Art. s. 103(a)( 4)-(5). 'Person' is used throughout the definition sections of 
Art. 4A but is not defined therein. Therefore, the Art. 1 definition would apply (UCC 
Art. 1 s. 105(d)). Under Art. 1, a' "person" includes an individual or an organization' 
42 (UCC Art. 1 s. 201(30)). No analogous definition exists in the Model Law. 
DCC Art. _4A_ s. 105(a)(2). The Model Law does not define 'bank'. To the contrary, 
Art. 1(2) 1~d1cat~s that the M<:>del Law applies 'to other entities that as an ordinary 
part of the1r busmess engage m executing payment orders in the same manner as it 
applies to banks'. 
:: DCC Art. 4A s. 103(a)(1)(i). 
See Model Law, Art. 3. 
INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS AND FIVE FOUNDATIONS OF WIRE-TRANSFER LAW 67 
reimbursed by debiting an account of, or otherwise receiving payment from, the 
sender.45 This means that credit transfers are included, but all electronic funds 
transfers that are debit transfers are excluded.46 In the hypothetical transaction, 
if Chase Manhattan Bank is reimbursed for the Dragon Fund's payment order by 
debiting an account of the Fund, then this requirement is met. 
The way in which this result is obtained raises the important distinction 
between a credit and debit transfer. 'In a credit transfer the instruction to pay 
is given by the person making payment. In a debit transfer the instruction to 
pay is given by the person receiving payment.'47 The classic example of a 
debit transfer involves a cheque or other negotiable instrument.48 In a cheque 
transaction, a debtor (the drawer of the cheque) gives authority to the creditor 
(the payee of the cheque) to draw on the debtor's account which is main-
tained at the payer bank (also called the drawee).49 The authority is given by 
drawing the cheque and transferring the cheque to the payee. In turn, the 
payee issues the instruction to pay to the payer bank when it deposits the 
cheque;50 that is, the payee (not the drawer) issues the instruction by 
depositing the cheque in the depository bank (at which the payee maintains 
an account), and the cheque is presented to the payer bank through the 
cheque collection process. 51 Assuming the payer bank honours the cheque, it 
is reimbursed by the debtor, not the person giving the instruction (the 
payee).52 'Article 4A is limited to transactions in which the account to be 
debited by the receiving bank is that of the person in whose name the 
instruction is given.' 53 The Model Law is limited in a similar manner. 54 In sum, 
in a wire transfer the payer (originator) issues the instruction (payment order) 
to the paying bank (originator's bank) and reimburses that bank. In a cheque 
transaction the payee issues the instruction (the cheque) and the paying bank 
(payer bank) is reimbursed by the drawer of the cheque. 
Finally, to qualify as a payment order, an instruction must be transmitted 
45 UCC Art. 4A s. 103(a)(l)(ii). See also Model Law, Art. 2(b)(i). 
46 See UCC Art. 4A s. 103(a)(1)(ii) official comment 4. 
47 Ibid. See also UCC Art. 4A Prefatory Note, p. 11. 
48 Negotiable instruments are governed by UCC Arts. 3 and 4. UCC Art. 3 s. 102, Art. 4 s. 
102. 
49 UCC Art. 3 s. 102(1)(d) (the 'drawer' is a secondary party on the cheque, whereas 
the payer bank becomes primarily liable upon accepting the cheq~~)! Art 3,s. 302 
('payee' may be a holder in due course); and Art 4 s. 10S(b) (defmltlon of payor 
bank'). 
5o UCC Art 3 s. 102(1)(a) (definition of 'issue'). 
5I UCC Art 4 s. 105(a) (definition of 'depository bank'). 
52 UCC Art 4A s. 104 official comment 4. 
53 Ibid. 
54 See UN Model Law, Art. 2(b)(i). 
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directly by the sender to the receiving bank (or its agent, funds-transfer system 
or communication system for subsequent transmission to the receiving 
bank). 55 In the hypothetical transaction, each instruction is directly transmitted 
from sender to receiving bank. This requirement serves to exclude from 
Article 4A and the Model Law payments made by means of a cheque or credit 
card, for example.56 
Assume that the parties know that a wire-transfer law like Article 4A or the 
Model Law applies to their transfer. Does it apply to the entire transfer, from 
the originator to the beneficiary? This is the issue of 'end-to-end' coverage. 
Generally speaking, Article 4A is intended to apply end-to-end. 57 The rules of a 
funds-transfer system like Fedwire - namely Regulation J of the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System - ensure such coverage. For 
example, if the wire transfer is through Fedwire, then whether remote parties 
(ie those that are not in privity with a Federal Reserve Bank) are bound by 
Regulation J depends on whether they had prior notice that (i) Fedwire might 
be used and (ii) the applicable law governing Fedwire is Regulation ].58 Privity 
means that the parties send payment orders directly to or receive orders 
directly from a Reserve Bank.59 These requirements presumably avoid the 
unwarranted extension of Regulation J or the extraterritorial application 
thereof in inappropriate situations.60 Regulation J, however, essentially states 
that Article 4A is the law governing Fedwire.61 Similarly, the rules of the CHIPS 
system make clear that Article 4A governs that system.62 
The Model Law governs a wire transfer where any sender and receiving 
bank are in different countries.63 In contrast to Article 4A, however, the Model 
Law does not purport to provide end-to-end coverage. Rather, it governs all 
parties in the wire-transfer chain from the originator to the beneficiary's bank. 
The relationship between the beneficiary's bank and the beneficiary is left to 
local law. 
55 UCC Art 4A s. 103(a)(1)(iii). 
56 UCC Art. 4A s. 103(a)(1) official comment 5. 
:: UCC Prefatory Note, iii, Art. 4A s. 507(c). 
12 CFR § 210.25(b)(2)(v). 
~~ 12 CFR § 210.25(b)(2)(ii)-(iii). 
61 See 12 CFR sub-pt B, app. A comment (a) to § 210.25. 
62 See Patrikis, Baxter and Bhala, op cit note 1, p. 140. See ibid, p. 191. 
63 Model Law, Art. 1(1). 
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Trigger Event 
At what point are the rights and obligations of a party to a wire transfer 
triggered? In other words, when does the party gain certain legal entitlements, 
and when is it legally 'on the hook' to perform certain duties? Appropriate 
answers to these questions can promote certainty. The answers can also 
ensure that wire transfers are conducted efficiently, specifically and at high 
speed. 
The answers are provided in Article 4A and the Model Law by the concept 
of acceptance. 'Rights and obligations under Article 4A arise as the result of 
"acceptance" of a payment order by the bank to which the order is addressed.'64 
(Emphasis added.) A similar though more narrowly crafted statement is found 
in the Model Law.65 Only when a receiving bank accepts a payment order 
issued by its sender are the rights and obligations of the receiving bank and 
sender triggered. 
As the hypothetical transaction suggests, acceptance is divided according to 
the class of receiving bank. A receiving bank other than the beneficiary's bank 
- in the example, the originator's bank and the intermediary bank (Chase 
Manhattan Bank and Barclays Bank, respectively) - can accept a payment 
order only by executing the order. 'Execution' means the issuance of a 
payment order that conforms with the terms of the order received from the 
sender.66 
In contrast, a beneficiary's bank is responsible for crediting the account 
of the beneficiary (or otherwise lawfully applying funds received on be-
half of the beneficiary). There are essentially three acts that constitute 
'acceptance' by a beneficiary's bank: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
payment by the beneficiary's bank to the beneficiary; 
notification from the beneficiary's bank to the beneficiary that a 
payment order has been received; or 
receipt of payment by the beneficiary's bank from the sender that 
issued the payment order to the beneficiary's bank.67 
64 UCC Art 4A Prefatory Note, p. iv. See also Art 4A s. 209 (regarding acceptance of a 
payment order) and official comment 1 thereto ('[a]cceptance of the payment 
order imposes an obligation on the receiving bank to the sender if the receiving 
bank is not the beneficiary's bank, or to the beneficiary if the receiving bank is the 
beneficiary's bank'). 
65 See UN Model Law, Art 5(6). 
66 UCC Art. 4A s. 209(a), Art. 4A s. 301(a). See also Model Law, Art 2(1) (defining 
'execution'). 
67 ucc Art 4A s. 209(b). This list is incomplete because there is a fourth manner of 
acceptance. A beneficiary's bank can do nothing with the payment order received 
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Acceptance occurs at the earliest of these times. The first two acts involve 
the 'downstream' relationship between the beneficiary's bank and its 
customer, the beneficiary.68 The third act involves the 'upstream' relation-
ship between the beneficiary's bank and its sender.69 
What rights and obligations are triggered upon acceptance of a payment 
order? Again, there is bifurcation. The basic duty of a sender whose pay-
ment order is accepted by a receiving bank is to pay the receiving bank for 
the order. Conversely, the basic right of the receiving bank is to be paid for the 
accepted order. While this right-duty set is triggered upon acceptance, it does 
not mature until the execution date?0 In addition, the sender has a right to 
have its payment order, upon acceptance, executed at the right time, in the 
right amount, and to the right place.71 This is a trinity of rights which, from the 
receiving bank's perspective, constitutes a trinity of duties. 
The right-duty set pertaining to the beneficiary's bank and the beneficiary is 
straightforward. Upon acceptance of a payment order, the beneficiary's bank 
has an obligation to pay the order, and the beneficiary has a right to be paid.72 
(Cont.) 
and waits until the opening of the next funds-transfer business day. In other words, 
the beneficiary's bank can defer acceptance overnight (and, therefore, defer 
payment to the beneficiary). The incentive to do this is to 'buy time' to see whether 
the sender will pay for the order. (Delaying acceptance is not possible if the 
beneficiary's bank has been paid by its sender, because that payment is by 
definition a form of acceptance.) UCC Art. 4A s. 209(b)(3) and official comment 5. 
See also Art. 4A s. 405 official comment 2. Of course, this method of acceptance is 
unavailable if the wire transfer is through a system like Fedwire, because the 
payment order and payment are received simultaneously. 68 Payment by a beneficiary's bank to a beneficiary is governed by UCC Art. 4A s. 405, 
which is discussed below in the context of the receiver finality rule. 69 Payment by a sender to a receiving bank is covered in UCC Art. 4A s. 403 and Model 
Law, Art. 6. 
70 UCC Art. 4A s. 402(c). Note that if the receiving bank is the beneficiary's bank, then 
the obligation of the sender to pay matures on the payment date, which is the date 
the order is payable by the beneficiary's bank to the beneficiary. Thus, the 
bene~iciary's bank is afforded the legal protection of being entitled to payment 
from 1ts sender no later than the time it must pay its customer - ie it need not have 
paid out before receiving inter-bank settlement. UCC Art. 4A s. 402(b). Under the 
Model Law, a similar scheme is established. See Model Law, Arts. 8, 11. However, if a 
receiving bank does not execute a payment order on the day it is received, then it 
must do so for value as of the date of receipt. Model Law, Art. 11(2). This rule 
prevents the receiving bank from obtaining 'float' with respect to funds paid for the 
payment order. 
71 4A 
72 UCC Art. s. 302(a). See also Model Law, Art. 8(2). 
ucc. Art. 4A s. 404(a). See also Model Law, Art. 10(1) (referring to local law for the 
details of payment by the beneficiary's bank to the beneficiary). 
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These mature on the payment date which, typically, is the day the order is 
received by the beneficiary's bank?3 
Receiver Finality 
When does a beneficiary know that it has received 'good funds'? If Vickers 
Ballas receives a US$100,000 credit to its account, is the credit provisional 
(revocable), on the one hand, or final on the other hand? If the credit is 
revocable, then Vickers Ballas cannot irrevocably commit the US$100,000 to 
other uses (eg paying its bills, buying stock for its own account, and the like). 
This is because DBS (the beneficiary's bank) might demand that the 
US$100,000 be returned if the bank does not finally receive payment from 
the intermediary bank. An answer to this dilemma is crucial if a wire transfer is 
to be a certain, efficient (especially high-speed), and fair mode of payment. 
Once a beneficiary's bank has paid the beneficiary, it has thereby satisfied 
the obligation to pay the beneficiary that arises from its acceptance of a 
payment order on behalf of the beneficiary. The payment is final?4 The pay-
ment for the wire transfer cannot be recovered by the beneficiary's bank. This 
is the receiver finality rule. Even the beneficiary's right to withdraw a credit (ie 
even if the beneficiary's account has been credited but the beneficiary has not 
withdrawn the credit) cannot be revoked. 
The receiver finality rule is subject to one important exception75 Consider a 
major settlement failure in a funds-transfer system that nets payment 
obligations on a multilateral (or net-net) basis and has a loss-sharing 
arrangement among participants in the system to handle a settlement failure 
by one or more participants76 If a beneficiary's bank accepts a payment order 
but the multilateral netting system fails to complete settlement in spite of the 
operation of the loss-sharing scheme, then the acceptance is nullified and the 
beneficiary's bank can recover funds from the beneficiary.77 In this unwind scen-
ario, the wire transfer is not completed, the originator is not discharged of its 
73 ucc Art 4A s. 401. 
74 UCC Art 4A s. 40S(c). As explained above, the Model Law does not contain a 
receiver finality rule because it does not purport to govern the relationship between 
the beneficiary's bank and the beneficiary. That relationship is governed by local 
law. 
75 An additional exception, not treated here, pertains to wire transfers involving 
automated clearing houses. See UCC Art 4A s. 405(d). 
76 ucc Art 4A s. 40S(e). The classic example of such a system is CHIPS. 
77 Ibid. 
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underlying obligation to the beneficiary, and each sender is excused from its 
obligation to pay for its payment order. 
This exception to the receiver finality rule supports the development of loss-
sharing agreements and other methods to achieve finality on privately 
operated funds-transfer systems that rely on netting. The unwind exception 
is a 'last resort escape' from potentially expensive settlement guarantees that 
remaining (and presumably solvent) participants in the funds-transfer system 
might be unable to meet. Only by accounting for the potential trade-off 
between settlement guarantees and finality can the law promote netting 
systems designed to offer their users finality on a routine basis. 
Because of this exception to the receiver finality rule, some observers (eg 
officials at the Bundesbank and Bank for International Settlements) contend that 
a real-time gross-settlement (RTGS) funds-transfer system is preferable to a 
netting system. In an RTGS system there is no worrisome overhang of a possible 
settlement unwind, yet this possibility plagues a multilateral netting system. Of 
course, netting serves the purpose of lowering systemic risk by reducing the 
number and volume of wire transfers. Ultimately, the choice between the 
systems may depend on country, market and technological conditions. 
The receiver finality rule is constrained when the beneficiary's bank (having 
accepted a payment order) has a 'reasonable doubt concerning the right of the 
beneficiary to payment'?8 But the beneficiary's bank risks incurring liability for 
consequential damages as a result of its nonpayment if the beneficiary demands 
payment, the bank has notice of 'particular circumstances that will give rise to 
consequential damages as a result of nonpayment', and it is shown that the bank 
lacked reasonable doubt.79 This is the only instance in Article 4A where 
consequential damages are a remedy provided by the statute, in the absence of a 
written agreement between parties that calls for consequential damages.80 
In stark contrast to Article 4A, the Model Law contains no receiver finality 
rule. As mentioned above, the Model Law does not purport to intrude on the 
relationship between a beneficiary's bank and the beneficiary. A receiver 
finality rule is a rule about this relationship, dictating whether and when a 
credit to a beneficiary's account might be revoked by the beneficiary's bank. 
Thus, the Model Law provides that the beneficiary's bank must place funds at 
the disposal of the beneficiary 'in accordance with the payment order and the 
78 UCC Art 4A s. 404{a). 
79 Ibid. 
80 
UCC Art. 4A s. 305{c)-{d) (consequential damages for late or improper execution of 
a payment order, or failure to execute a payment order, are not recoverable unless 
agreed to expressly in writing by the receiving bank). 
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law governing the relationship between the bank and the beneficiary'.81 
(Emphasis added.) 
Interloper Fraud Rule 
As the recent Australian case of Swiss Bank Corporation v. State Bank of New 
South Wales illustrates, modern day electronic pirates abound.82 A fraudsper-
son - also called an interloper - claiming to be an official of the Dragon Fund 
could send a payment order to Chase Manhattan Bank instructing that 
US$100,000 be paid to an account No 10017 at the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International (BCCI) in the Grand Cayman Islands. How is Chase 
Manhattan Bank to determine whether the payment order is really that of its 
customer, the Dragon Fund? If Chase Manhattan Bank executes the order and 
debits the Dragon Fund's account for US$100,000, is the bank obliged tore-
credit the account when it is discovered that the payment order was not 
authentic? What if the payment order is issued by an employee or agent of the 
Dragon Fund that has access to its bank account information? Appropriate 
answers to these questions promote certainty, efficiency in the sense of high 
security, and fairness. 
Article 4A and the Model Law address the interloper fraud problem through 
the concept of a 'security procedure' and rules based on the existence or non-
existence of such a security procedure. 
A security procedure is the generic term for a device or method (whether an 
electronic message authentication or other computer algorithm, code words, 
telephone call-back, or the like) for 'verifying that a payment order is that of 
the customer .. .'83 The Article 4A rules are summarised as follows. 
In a large percentage of cases, the payment order of the originator of the funds 
transfer is transmitted electronically to the originator's bank. In these cases it may 
not be possible for the bank to know whether the electronic message has been 
authorized by its customer. To ensure that no unauthorized person is transmitting 
messages to the bank, the normal practice is to establish security procedures that 
usually involve the use of codes or identifying words. If the bank accepts a 
payment order that purports to be that of its customer after verifying its 
authenticity by complying with a security procedure agreed to by the customer 
and the bank, the customer is bound to pay the order even if it was not authorized. 
81 Model Law, Art. 10(1). 
82 See unreported judgment, New South Wales Supreme Court, Commercial Division, 
Action No 50693 of 1989 (Rogers CJ) (interim judgment delivered 9 December 
1992, final judgment delivered 30 April1993). -
83 ucc Art 4A s. 201. See Model Law, Art. 5(1). 
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But there is an important limitation on this rule. The bank is entitled to payment in 
the case of an unauthorized order only if the court finds that the security 
procedure was a commercially reasonable method of providing security against 
unauthorized payment orders. The customer can also avoid liability if it can prove 
that the unauthorized order was not initiated by an employee or other agent of the 
customer having access to confidential security information or by a person who 
obtained that information from a source controlled by the customer ... If the bank 
accepts an unauthorized payment order without verifying it in compliance with a 
security procedure, the loss falls on the bank.84 (Emphasis added.) 
This summary also characterises the Model Law interloper fraud rule.85 Thus, 
three analytical steps are apparent from the summary: the agreement; 
commercial reasonability; and the 'not an insider' defence. 
First, has a security procedure been established pursuant to an agreement 
between the sender and receiving bank? If no procedure exists, then 
interloper fraud issues are resolved under non-Article 4A or non-Model Law 
principles, specifically, the law of agency; that is, the law that establishes when 
one person is considered to be acting on behalf of another.86 The resolution 
that might be achieved under this law will turn on whether the fraudsperson 
sent the payment order with the authority (whether actual or apparent) of the 
purported sender. Thus, if no security procedure exists between the Dragon 
Fund and Chase Manhattan Bank, then whether the payment order issued by 
the fraudsperson was authorised by the Dragon Fund will be determined 
under applicable agency law principles. 
A security procedure, in theory, is not unilaterally imposed by one party or 
the other, but rather results from negotiations culminating in a written account 
agreement. To be sure, many customers are likely to have a standard-form 
contract specifying a particular procedure presented to them by their banks. 
Assuming that a security procedure has been agreed to between the bank and 
its customer, the next step is to consider whether that procedure is 
'commercially reasonable'. 
'Commercial reasonability' is a question of law, not fact. The judge's 
discretion is limited by Article 4A, which sets out criteria for evaluating 
whether a security procedure is commercially reasonable in a case at bar: 'the 
wishes of the customer expressed to the bank, the circumstances of the 
customer known to the bank, including the size, type and frequency of 
payment orders normally issued by the customer to the bank, alternative 
security procedures offered to the customer, and security procedures in 
84 
Article 4A Prefatory Note, p. vii. The rules are set forth at Art. 4A ss. 201 to 204. 85 See Model Law, Art. S. 86 UCC Art. 4A s. 202(a). 
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general use by customers and receiving banks similarly situated.'87 No similar 
limitation exists in the Model Law. 
To avoid liability, the originator's bank in the hypothetical transaction must 
prove that the security procedure it agreed to with its customer is 
commercially reasonable. In addition, the bank must show that it accepted 
the payment order in 'good faith' and in compliance with the procedure.88 
Acting in good faith and following the security procedure are issues of fact 
and, therefore, matters for a trier of fact such as a jury. 
In the hypothetical wire transfer, suppose the originator argues that the 
US$100,000 payment order issued in its name and accepted by the 
originator's bank was unauthorised, and the ensuing US$100,000 debit to 
its account should be reversed. Suppose also that Chase Manhattan Bank 
proves to a judge that the security procedure in operation between it and the 
Dragon Fund by which the payment order was verified was commercially 
reasonable. Suppose further that the bank also proves to the trier of fact that 
it acted in good faith in accepting the order and in compliance with the 
procedure. Has the purported originator, the innocent customer of the bank, 
lost the case? 
Not necessarily, because of the 'not an insider' defence. The suspect 
payment order may have been issued by a person who was not an employee 
or agent of the Dragon Fund, and who did not gain access to the Fund's bank 
account information through someone controlled by the Fund. In other 
words, the fraudsperson may not have been an 'insider' of the Dragon Fund 
or someone close to an insider. If the 'innocent' Dragon Fund proves these 
facts, then Chase Manhattan Bank cannot retain payment for the payment 
order. 
Note that the burden of proof has shifted: Chase Manhattan Bank has the 
burden on the matters of a security procedure agreement, commercial 
reasonability, and good faith and compliance; but the customer purporting 
to be a victim of fraud has the burden of the 'not an insider' defence.89 Note 
also that the 'not an insider' defence is difficult to maintain successfully. A large 
number of fraud, and even attempted fraud, cases appear to involve insiders. 
87 UCC Art. 4A s. 202(c). Note that a security procedure can be deemed commercially 
reasonable, and this presents bank counsel with a useful negotiating tactic. See 
Patrikis, Baxter and Bhala, 'Article 4A: The New Law of Funds Transfers and the Role 
of Counsel', op cit note 26, pp. 235-236. 
88 UCC Art. 4A s. 202(b). 'Good faith' is defined in Art 4A s. 105(a)(6) as 'honesty in fact 
and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing'. There is no 
analogous defmition in the Model Law. 
89 ucc Art 4A s. 202, Art 4A s. 203. 
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There is no comparative negligence analysis or sharing of liability in this 
legal scheme. The purported sender/innocent customer (the Dragon Fund) 
bears the full US$100,000 loss (in that its account is not re-credited) if (i) the 
bank proves that it acted in good faith and complied with a commercially 
reasonable security procedure and (ii) the customer cannot meet the innocent 
customer defence requirements.90 
Money-back Guarantee and Discharge 
In the hypothetical wire transfer, what rights does each sender (the originator, 
originator's bank and intermediary bank) have if the wire transfer is not 
completed? (A wire transfer is complete when the beneficiary's bank accepts a 
payment order for the benefit of the beneficiary of the originator's order.)91 
For example, is the Dragon Fund entitled to a refund ofUS$100,000, or must it 
commence litigation against some downstream party to recover the funds? 
What rights do Chase Manhattan Bank and Barclays Bank have in the event of 
non-completion? Does completion have an effect on the underlying 
contractual obligation of the Dragon Fund to pay US$100,000 to Vickers 
Ballas? Appropriate answers to these questions promote certainty, efficiency in 
the form of low litigation costs, and fairness. 
A money-back guarantee rule ensures that the originator of a wire transfer, 
and each subsequent sender of a payment order in the wire-transfer chain, 
obtains its money back in the event the transfer is not completed. As indicated 
above, a wire transfer is said to be completed when the beneficiary's bank 
accepts a payment order on behalf of the beneficiary. If the transfer is not 
completed, then each sender of a payment order in the wire-transfer chain is 
entitled to a refund of the principal amount of the payment order, plus any 
accrued interest.92 If the transfer is completed, then the originator's underlying 
contractual obligation to the beneficiary is discharged.93 
In the hypothetical wire transfer, as soon as DBS accepts the payment order 
90 The concept of an 'electronic signature' is a potential security procedure. However, 
the precise meaning of this concept is unclear. On the one hand, it could involve a 
means to identify the originator of a funds transfer - in effect, a personal 
identification code. On the other hand, it could mean not only such a code, but also 
a method of telling where the originator is located, the computer used to send a 
payment order, etc - in effect, a tracing device. Whatever the meaning, the critical 
legal issue is commercial reasonability. 
91 Article 4A s. 104(a). See Model Law, Arts. 14(1), 19(1). 
92 UCC Art 4A s. 402(c)-(d). See also Model Law, Art. 14(1). 
93 UCC Art 4A s. 406(b). See also Model Law, Art 19 footnote. 
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issued by Barclays Bank, the transfer is complete and the Dragon Fund is 
discharged of its underlying obligation to pay US$100,000 to Vickers Ballas. In 
the event of non-completion, each sender - the Dragon Fund, Chase 
Manhattan Bank and Barclays Bank - is entitled to a refund of any amount it 
paid for its payment order, plus interest94 
The money-back guarantee may not be varied by an agreement between the 
sender and receiving bank.95 However, the rule is subject to the exception that 
a sender that selects a particular intermediary bank through which to route a 
wire transfer bears the risk of loss associated with the failure of that bank.96 
Suppose the Dragon Fund instructs its bank to route the US$100,000 transfer 
through BCCI instead of Barclays Bank, and Chase Manhattan Bank complies with 
this instruction and debits its customer's account Assume that BCCI is closed by 
banking supervisors. The closure occurs after BCCI accepts the payment order 
issued by Chase Manhattan Bank and is paid for the order by that bank, but 
before the wire transfer is completed (ie before DBS accepts BCCI's order). The 
effective result of these facts is that the funds are 'stuck' at BCCI. Then, the 
originator is not entitled to are-credit of US$100,000. Chase Manhattan Bank can 
keep the US$100,000, and the Dragon Fund is subrogated to the right of its bank 
to claim against the receiver or trustee ofBCCI's assets. ('That is, the Dragon Fund's 
ability to retrieve the US$100,000 depends on the right of its bank to claim against 
the receiver.) In sum, the party (here, the originator) who designates the failed 
intermediary bank should and does bear the risk of adverse consequences of that 
choice. 
A Note on Bank Failure 
The consequences of bank failure on account holders depend in part on the 
time the failure occurs and on which bank in the wire-transfer chain fails. 
('i) Failure of an intermediary bank before completion. In the above 
example, BCCI fails before the wire transfer is complete. Therefore, 
94 The rate of interest is determined in accordance with UCC Art 4A s. 506. Unless 
otheiWise agreed, it is the Fed Funds rate. The Model Law calls for interest to be 
paid at the customary interbank rate (such as the Fed Funds rate or LffiOR) for the 
banking community for the funds or money involved. See Model Law, Art 2(m). 
95 UCC Art 4A s. 402{f). See also Model Law, Art 14(2). Note, however, that the Model 
Law carves out an exception that allows the money-back guarantee to be varied 
when a 'prudent' originator's bank would not have accepted a particular payment 
order because of a 'significant' risk in the wire transfer. The scope of this exception 
is unclear. 
96 UCC Art 4A s. 402(d). See also Model Law, Art 14(3). 
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the risk of loss is assumed by the party that designated the use of the 
intermediary bank. 
(ii) Failure of an intermediary bank after completion. If BCCI fails after 
the transfer is complete, then the beneficiary's bank must have 
accepted a payment order from BCCI, and the originator must have 
been discharged, before the failure. This is because of the definition 
of 'completion' and the discharge rule.97 Under Article 4A (but not 
the Model Law), payment by the beneficiary's bank to the 
beneficiary is final because of the receiver finality rule.98 Whether 
the beneficiary's bank was paid by BCCI for the order it received 
and accepted from BCCI before the beneficiary's bank paid the 
beneficiary depends on the facts of the case. If the beneficiary's 
bank accepts BCCI's order by paying the beneficiary before 
receiving settlement from BCCI, then the beneficiary's bank assumes 
the risk of loss from a BCCI failure.99 
(iii) Failure of the originator's bank before acceptance. The above 
discussion prompts the question of what happens if BCCI remains 
solvent, but the originator's bank or the beneficiary's bank fails. 
Consider first the case where the originator's bank fails before 
accepting the originator's payment order. Plainly, the wire transfer is 
not complete and the originator's obligation to pay US$100,000 to 
the beneficiary is not discharged. Because the originator's bank 
failed before acceptance, the duty of the originator to pay the 
originator's bank for its order never matured; hence the originator is 
not liable for the order it issued.100 It is entitled to a refund of any 
money it might have paid to the originator's bank for its payment 
order. 
(iv) Failure of the originator's bank after acceptance. If the originator's 
bank fails after accepting the order, then the originator is obliged to 
pay for its order.101 Assuming a same-day execution scenario, the 
97 UCC Art 4A s. 104(a), Art. 4A s. 406, respectively. See also Model Law, Art 19(1) and 
footnote, respectively. 
98 UCC Art 4A s. 40S(c). 
99 Under UCC Art 4A s. 209(b)(l) (clause (i)), one manner in which the beneficiary's 
bank can accept a payment order is by paying the beneficiary in accordance with 
Art 4A s. 40S(a) or (b). Article 4A s. 40S(a) concerns a credit to the beneficiary's 
account, and Art. 4A s. 40S(b) concerns payment by means other than a credit as 
determined by 'principles oflaw that determine when an obligation is satisfied'. 'nle 
point is that the beneficiary's bank can pay the beneficiary before the bank has 
received settlement from its sender. 
100 UCC Art. 4A s. 402(c). See also Model Law Art 5(6). 
101 Ibid. ' 
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originator's bank will have accepted the originator's payment order 
by issuing a conforming order - ie by executing the originator's 
order on the day it received the originator's order.102 If BCCI accepts 
the order of the originator's bank, then the originator's bank is liable 
to pay for its order.103 Whether this liability is affected by applicable 
Federal bank regulatory provisions is beyond the scope of this 
presentation, but the issue raises potentially intriguing legal and 
policy issues.104 
For example, the originator is not discharged until the benefi-
ciary's bank accepts an order from BCCI, but suppose BCCI is 
unwilling to accept the order issued by the originator's bank until 
the originator's bank provides settlement for its order. In this 
instance, BCCI presumably is unwilling to assume the risk that the 
originator's bank fails after BCCI accepts the order but before BCCI 
has been paid for the order. The originator will then bear that risk, 
because it may have paid the originator's bank for its payment order 
but not have been discharged of its underlying payment obligation 
to the beneficiary. If the originator's bank fails before discharge 
occurs, then the originator is liable to the beneficiary for US$100,000 
on the underlying contract and must claim against the originator's 
bank (or its receiver or liquidator) under the money-back guarantee 
(or perhaps other applicable law).105 This might be justified on the 
ground that the originator is the party that selected the use of the 
originator's bank by maintaining an account at, and issuing a 
payment order to, that bank. 
(v) Failure of the beneficiary's bank. Consider the scenario in which the 
beneficiary's bank fails. If this occurs after acceptance (and, 
therefore, completion), then the originator is discharged of its 
obligation.106 The beneficiary bears the risk of loss and must make a 
claim against the failed bank (or its receiver or liquidator). Again, this 
might be justifiable because the beneficiary is the party that 
designated to the originator in its underlying contract with the 
originator that payment should be made at the beneficiary's bank. If 
102 UCC Art 4A s. 209(a), Art. 4A s. 301. See also Model Law, Arts. 8(2), 11. 
103 UCC Art 4A s. 402(b). See also Model Law, Art. 5(6). 
104 This scenario is perhaps more likely given the prompt corrective action rules 
implemented pursuant to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement 
Act 1991, Pub. L. No 102-242, section 131 (1991). See 12 CFR, parts 208, 263. 
105 UCC Art. 4A s. 402(c). See also Model Law, Art. 14. 
106 ucc Art 4A s. 406. See also Model Law, Art. 19 footnote. 
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failure occurs before acceptance, then the wire transfer is not 
complete. The originator and each subsequent sender are entitled to 
the money-back guarantee.107 Presumably the originator will pay the 
beneficiary through a wire transfer directed to a different bene-
ficiary's bank (or through an alternative payments mechanism). 
Drafting Principles 
Intere~t Groups 
Law, including payments-system law, is not handed down from God. Rather, 
law results from a long and complicated interaction of interest groups that 
advance their economic, political and social agendas. Article 4A and the Model 
Law are examples of this interaction. Accordingly, neither Article 4A nor the 
Model Law appeared in the law books quickly. The drafters negotiated for 
years, working and re-working concepts and specific legal language. It would 
be foolish to suggest that the work of every drafter reflected the same or even 
similar theories as those held by every other drafter. On the contrary, different 
drafters had different theories and they negotiated, argued, and ultimately 
compromised with one another. 
However, it is possible to group the drafters of Article 4A into three broad 
interest groups: system users, system providers and system supervisors. The 
delegates to UNCITRAL that drafted the Model Law also tended to reflect these 
constituencies. The users of large-value credit-transfer systems - typically 
corporate customers and some (usually smaller) financial institutions - had 
consumer interests in mind. Their aim was to ensure that stringent liabilities 
were imposed on system providers. Hence they sought clear rules on 
misdirected payment orders, and to hold banks liable for consequential as 
well as actual damages under certain circumstances. Often, the arguments of 
users were cast in terms of fairness. 
Conversely, system providers - generally, large banks and owners of 
particular systems- sought to minimise their liabilities. They struggled to avoid 
the imposition of consequential damages, and to ensure that stringent rules 
governing authenticity and security procedures were drafted. Typically, their 
arguments were cast in terms of efficiency and reliability. 
Finally, system supervisors - central banks and finance ministries - sought 
to minimise systemic risks. Accordingly, they strongly advocated the receiver 
107 UCC Art. 4A s. 402(c). See also Model Law, Art. 14(1). 
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finality and discharge rules. They did not consistently side with users or pro-
viders. Indeed, often they played the role of mediator between users and 
providers, while at the same time keeping a watchful eye on their own 
interests. They would employ the language of fairness, efficiency or reliability 
depending on the needs of the problem at hand. 
When drafting a wire-transfer law, it may be useful to think in terms of users, 
providers and supervisors as three distinct interest groups whose concerns 
must be addressed. However, it is not necessarily desirable to encourage this 
tripartite division of interest groups during the drafting process. Many less 
developed and newly industrialised countries must draft legal frameworks for 
large-value funds-transfer systems in different environments from the one in 
which Article 4A and the Model Law were created. Thinking in terms of 
consumer, bank and supervisory interests may not necessarily reflect these 
different environments. 
Instead, it may be particularly fruitful to consider what questions are most 
pressing. For example, to what extent is the general commercial law 
framework well articulated and well developed? In some instances, the answer 
is that only a skeletal framework exists. Are bankruptcy rules in place to handle 
bank and customer insolvencies? In some cases, only nascent rules exist, and in 
other instances no such rules have been implemented. To what extent is fraud 
present in commercial transactions? Sadly, in some cases fraud is relatively 
commonplace. 
The special environment in developing and newly industrialising countries 
suggests five fundamental drafting principles. 
The Rule of Law 
First, as a threshold matter the importance of the rule of law must be 
established firmly. The payments-system law should be manifest at the highest 
level of the hierarchy of rules in a particular country. If, in a country's legal 
system, a statute has greater force and effect than a regulation, and in turn a 
regulation has greater force and effect than an administrative order, then the 
law governing wire transfers should take the form of a statute. This form 
should afford greater protection against political or bureaucratic meddling in 
the payments system. Of course, in certain countries - for instance, Vietnam -
passing a statute is a more cumbersome process than issuing a regulation. 
Nonetheless, the rule of law is fundamental to the certain, efficient and fair 
operation of a funds-transfer system, thus procedural hurdles in passing laws 
must be overcome. 
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Accountability 
Secondly, institutions involved in wire transfers should be held accountable 
for their own behaviour. Such parties should not expect assistance from the 
government in the event of mishaps or financial difficulties. The utmost 
importance must be accorded rules of law, not relationships among parties or 
between a party and the government. In general, a wire-transfer law must be 
part of a larger legal environment that is founded on individual financial 
accountability, not (as in former communist countries) central planning and 
control. In this regard, the participation of the central bank in the funds-
transf~r system should not be overemphasised. There is no necessary reason 
why it must own and operate a system. Indeed, private party action and 
responsibility ought to be encouraged in countries in transition toward a 
market economy. 
Integration with Other Bodies of Law 
Thirdly, wire-transfer law cannot develop in a vacuum. This law must be seen 
as part of the broad commercial and bankruptcy framework and not 
developed in a piecemeal fashion. Accordingly, the rules governing large-
value credit transfers must be consistent with those established for contracts, 
negotiable instruments, letters of credit, secured transactions and insolvencies. 
Thus, for example, the concepts of 'commercial reasonability' or 'good faith' 
must be used consistently throughout the framework. The economic 
incentives created by the different parts of the framework must also be 
consistent. Commercial law is a seamless web, and thus there must be a holistic 
integrity to the law. 
Fraud Prevention 
Fourthly, particular emphasis must be given to fraud prevention. Accordingly, 
appropriate safeguards must be implemented that create incentives for all 
parties to a large-value credit transfer to exercise at least reasonable care. More 
generally, the legal framework must be seen as a primary guarantor of the 
integrity of the payments system. Nothing undermines that integrity faster than 
fraud. However, in drafting rules on fraud prevention, an inevitable tension 
between security and efficiency must be managed. On the one hand, requiring 
receiving banks and their sender customers to exercise great diligence in 
preventing fraud raises the level of security. On the other hand, the greater the 
burden on receiving banks and senders to act as policemen against fraud, the 
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higher the monetary cost of a wire transfer, and the longer it may take to 
process a transfer. There is no simple recipe for managing this tension; rather, 
the appropriate solution will depend on the country in question. 
Supporting the Financial Markets 
Fifthly, the legal framework for wire transfers should accommodate the 
anticipated growth and development of the economy and its constituent 
sectors. In the US and other post-industrial societies, the primary motivation 
for engaging in such transfers is not to settle payments obligations arising from 
the sale of goods. As the above hypothetical transaction suggests, the bulk of 
wire-transfer activity is generated by financial transactions - the buying and 
selling of foreign exchange, short-term money-market instruments, and various 
types of investment securities. Accordingly, in developing a legal framework 
for large-value credit-transfers systems, the future needs of the financial 
community must be anticipated and addressed.108 
Summary 
The legal foundations of American large-value credit-transfer systems, Fedwire 
and CHIPS, are set forth in Article 4A The same legal foundations are found in 
the Model Law. Among the many provisions in these legal texts, at least five are 
particularly noteworthy: 
(i) a rule defining the scope of the law; 
(ii) a rule establishing when the rights and obligations of parties to a 
wire transfer are triggered; 
(iii) a receiver finality rule (in Article 4A, but not the Model Law); 
(iv) a rule assigning liability for interloper fraud; and 
(v) a money-back guarantee rule, coupled with provisions on discharge. 
The rules are articulated through precise terminology identifying each party to 
a wire transfer and the actions that each party undertakes. 
Must the five rules exist in any wire-transfer statute? To what extent can one 
generalise from the Article 4A or Model Law experience? These questions 
deserve two levels of analysis. First, comparative legal research on the laws 
governing large-value credit-transfer systems in other jurisdictions is needed to 
tos See Bhala, 'The Inverted Pyramid of Wire Transfer Law', op cit note 4. 
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identify the foundations of those laws. In other words, those laws need to be 
distilled. Secondly, theoretical debate, involving economic rationales and 
public policy goals, is required to determine the justifications for alternative 
statutory foundations. 
These analyses have yet to be performed, but one point of caution is 
appropriate: commercial law, including wire-transfer law, is not immutable. It 
serves parties and their transactions, but because both of these change over 
time, individual needs and systemic concerns vary as well. Accordingly, the 
legal foundations for wire transfers should be viewed as dynamic. 
